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REMAINING SILENT IN INDIAN COUNTRY:
SELF-INCRIMINATION AND GRANTS OF IMMUNITY
FOR TRIBAL COURT DEFENDANTS
Philipp C. Kunze*
Abstract: A defendant in state and federal courts is entitled to a constitutional protection
against self-incrimination. The Fifth Amendment establishes this privilege, which can only be
overcome through a voluntary waiver or by the granting of an appropriate level of immunity.
Those grants of immunity were made mutually binding on the state and federal governments
in Kastigar v. United States and Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor.
However, in Talton v. Mayes, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments do not limit the conduct of the more than 560 federally recognized Indian tribes
within the boundaries of the United States. In response, Congress exercised its plenary power
and passed the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA). Under federal law, ICRA extended many, but
not all, protections afforded under the Bill of Rights to tribal defendants without any required
action from the tribes; many of the provisions are verbatim from the Constitution’s
amendments. However, the complicated distribution of jurisdiction amongst sovereigns, as
well as the tribal authority to create and implement unique constitutions and systems of justice,
calls into question the standard by which to evaluate violations of the privilege against selfincrimination in tribal court. Furthermore, rare examples exist in which a court of any
jurisdiction has considered or extended the mutually binding nature of grants of immunity and
the use of testimony compelled by a separate jurisdiction to include tribal courts. This
Comment suggests that violations of ICRA’s protections against self-incrimination be
evaluated under a Fifth Amendment standard, utilizing U.S. Supreme Court precedent. This
approach ensures a predictable analysis that is consistent with the legislative intent of ICRA
and minimizes potential complications upon federal habeas review. This Comment further
suggests that the universal application of Fifth Amendment precedent is a prerequisite for
mutual and binding recognition of tribal, state, and federal grants of immunity. Mutual
recognition places tribal courts on equal footing with state and federal courts. Further, a
defendant facing prosecution in two or more courts exercising concurrent jurisdiction benefits
when courts extend and recognize binding grants of immunity. Lastly, when grants of
immunity apply in each jurisdiction, tribal courts and communities are empowered to pursue
avenues of justice unique to tribal traditions and cultures.

INTRODUCTION
In 1883, the U.S. Supreme Court decided the seminal case of Ex parte
Crow Dog.1 The Court held the Dakota Territory federal court did not
* J.D. Candidate, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2019. The author is an officer in
the U.S. Coast Guard, as well as an admitted spokesperson before the Tulalip Tribal Bar. The
opinions, conclusions, and views expressed herein are solely those of the author; they are not to be
construed as official and do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, the U.S. Coast
Guard, or the Tulalip Tribes and their agencies. The author gratefully thanks the staff of Washington
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have jurisdiction to hear the case of an Indian defendant accused of the
homicide of another Indian on the Great Sioux Reservation.2 Ex parte
Crow Dog triggered more than 140 years of extensive judicial history,3 as
the Court analyzed often contradictory, vacillating, and heavy-handed
congressional action imposing laws on the Indian tribes.4
Greater awareness of the disparities of rights available to Indians was
achieved contemporaneously to the broader civil rights movement
sweeping the nation in the 1960s.5 Congress responded to perceived
shortcomings in the protections of Indian defendants in tribal courts and
passed the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA).6 While ICRA afforded
Indians in tribal court many of the privileges and protections of the
Constitution’s Bill of Rights7 that are essential to the criminal process,
Congress also made some notable exceptions.8 For example, ICRA does
not include an establishment clause, a right to bear arms, or legal
representation for indigent defendants.9
Despite many of the differences between ICRA and the Bill of Rights,
both documents utilize substantially similar, and sometimes verbatim,
language to describe the enumerated rights. By their terms, ICRA and the
Constitution impose nearly “identical limitation[s]”10 on the federal and
tribal governments, including a privilege against self-incrimination.11
However, courts have applied various standards of analysis and

Law Review for their patience and tireless editing to make this Comment possible. Thank you also to
Professor Robert Anderson for his insight and guidance, and to Professors Molly Cohan and Brenda
Williams of the Tulalip Tribal Defense Clinic.
1. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
2. Id. at 572.
3. See generally United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,
435 U.S. 191 (1978); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978); Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S.
376 (1896).
4. See generally Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2012); Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25
U.S.C. §§ 1301–1304 (2012 & Supp. III 2015); Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of
2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, tit. IX, 127 Stat. 54, 118–26 (codified in scattered sections of 18, 25, and 42
U.S.C.); Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, tit. II, 124 Stat. 2258, 2261–301
(codified in scattered sections of 25 and 42 U.S.C.).
5. VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN JUSTICE 127–28
(1983).
6. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 77 (1968) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1303 (2012)).
7. U.S. CONST. amends. I–X.
8. Compare U.S. CONST. amends. VI–VII, with 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (discussing the right to a jury
trial and representation by counsel).
9. 25 U.S.C. § 1302.
10. United States v. Becerra-Garcia, 397 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2005).
11. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. V, with 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(4).
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interpretation to assess compliance with ICRA’s provisions—some have
emphasized tribal sovereignty, while others have looked to the textual
similarities and congressional intent.12 The tribal defendant’s exposure to
prosecution in tribal, federal, and state courts further complicates the
inconsistent standard of analysis.
In United States v. Lara,13 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a
congressional statute which recognized the tribes’ inherent sovereign
power to prosecute non-member Indians and removed political
restrictions on such prosecutions.14 A tribal defendant is thus subject to
prosecution in any tribal court within the United States and, therefore, the
defendant is subject to each tribal court’s unique constitution and
interpretation of ICRA. The Court also held that prosecuting a tribal
defendant under both tribal and federal law did not violate the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution.15
According to both the Constitution and ICRA, the government may not
compel a person “in any criminal case to be a witness against
themselves.”16 Although federal and state defendants are entitled to the
privilege against self-incrimination articulated by the Fifth Amendment,
defendants may still be compelled to testify through the granting of use
and derivative use immunity or transactional immunity.17 Because a grant
of immunity minimizes or eliminates the threat of prosecution based on
the compelled testimony, the defendant receives “very substantial
protection, commensurate with [the protection] resulting from invoking”
the Fifth Amendment and must therefore testify.18 However, once a
federal or state entity makes such a grant of immunity, it is mutually
binding on other jurisdictions to the extent that the compelled testimony
or its derivative evidence is the basis for a subsequent prosecution of the
defendant.19 Only a few courts have considered whether federal and state
12. Compare United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 210 (2004) (tribal sovereignty), with BecerraGarcia, 397 F.3d at 1171 (textual similarities).
13. 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
14. Lara, 541 U.S. at 210. The statute in question was called the “Duro fix,” Pub. L. No. 102-137,
105 Stat. 646 (1991), and was passed in the wake of Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990). As the Lara
Court explained, Duro had held “that a tribe no longer possessed inherent or sovereign authority to
prosecute a ‘nonmember Indian.’” Lara, 541 U.S. at 197 (citing Duro, 495 U.S. at 682).
15. Id.
16. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself . . . .”); 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (“No Indian tribe . . . shall . . . compel any person
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . .”).
17. 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001–6005 (2012).
18. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 461 (1972).
19. Id.; Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52, 80 (1964).
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grants of immunity are binding on tribal courts,20 and none have
considered the binding effect of tribal grants of immunity.
This Comment analyzes the interaction between the Fifth Amendment
and ICRA and the impact of applying federal and tribal standards of
analysis to tribal defendants. Part I traces the protections provided by the
Fifth Amendment and the development of mutually binding grants of
immunity in federal and state courts. Part II provides a general overview
of the complicated jurisdictional scheme and relationship between the
tribes, the several states, and the federal government. Part III follows the
passage of ICRA and the various standards of analysis applied to its
provisions. Part IV argues that courts of all jurisdictions should analyze
violations of ICRA’s self-incrimination provision under a federal Fifth
Amendment standard. This Part also argues that the threat of prosecution
in a tribal court is sufficient to invoke Fifth Amendment protections in
federal or state court. Lastly, Part V argues that, having adopted a uniform
standard of analysis for self-incrimination violations, grants of immunity
by tribal, state, or federal courts should be mutually binding.
I.

FIFTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION IN THE UNITED
STATES

Federal and state courts must comply with the constitutional mandates
enumerated in the Bill of Rights. A defendant or witness is generally
entitled to invoke a privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth
Amendment, and compelling testimony without the appropriate
constitutional safeguards is typically prohibited. One permissible avenue
of compelling testimony without violating the Fifth Amendment is
through grants of immunity which prohibit the direct use or derivative use
of such testimony against the defendant or witness in future prosecutions.
A.

The Fifth Amendment Protects Against a Defendant’s or Witness’s
Compelled Self-Incrimination

“I plead the Fifth!” is a common refrain found on the news, on
television shows, and in movies.21 Although the Bill of Rights protects
20. In re Long Visitor, 523 F.2d 443 (8th Cir. 1975); Navajo Nation v. MacDonald Jr., 19 Indian
L. Rep. 6079 (Navajo Nation Sup. Ct. 1992); Tracy v. Superior Court of Maricopa Cty., 810 P.2d
1030 (Ariz. 1991).
21. See, e.g., CNBC, Martin Shkreli Testifies Before Congress: Full Testimony, YOUTUBE (Feb. 4,
2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LPIQ_gyiHag (last visited Oct. 1, 2018); Comedy
Central, Chappelle’s Show - Tron Carter’s “Law & Order” – Uncensored, YOUTUBE (Mar. 1, 2018),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HeOVbeh2yr0 (last visited Oct. 1, 2018); MISS SLOANE
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one’s right to silence, the right is not absolute; the defendant or witness
must first be entitled to invoke those protections.22
The Fifth Amendment provides in relevant part that “no
person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself.”23 As a protection against “testimonial compulsion,”24 this right
is “accorded liberal construction in favor of the right it was intended to
secure.”25 Further, despite the clear limiting language, the protections
offered by the Fifth Amendment may be more broadly “asserted in any
proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or judicial, investigatory or
adjudicatory.”26 However, the Fifth Amendment’s protections must still
be “confined to instances where the witness has reasonable cause to
apprehend danger from a direct answer.”27
When a witness or defendant invokes the protections of the Fifth
Amendment, the judge must determine if the “silence is justified.”28 A
court will consider the questions posed to the individual, the questions’
implications, and the setting in which the questions were asked; then the
court determines whether a responsive answer or explanatory demurral
would threaten the invoked privilege.29 Ultimately, the court must
determine if the witness has a reasonable cause to apprehend danger of
prosecution from a direct answer.30 The court will decline the witness’s
invocation of the privilege only if it is clear under all the circumstances
that the witness is mistaken and that the contested testimony cannot
incriminate the witness.31

(FilmNation Entm’t 2016); Theodore Schleifer & Laura Koran, Judicial Watch: Clinton IT Staffer
Pleads
5th
125
Consecutive
Times,
CNN
(June
22,
2016,
8:56
PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2016/06/22/politics/bryan-pagliano-judicial-watch-deposition/index.html
[https://perma.cc/3YG7-Q9TY].
22. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951).
23. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
24. Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486.
25. Id.
26. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444 (1972) (citing Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n,
378 U.S. 52, 93–94 (1964) (White, J., concurring)).
27. Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 486–87.
30. Id. at 486.
31. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 580 (1891) (citing Temple v. Commonwealth, 75 Va.
892 (1881)).
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Invoking the Fifth Amendment also requires satisfying three
concurrent criteria.32 First, the demanded evidence must be testimonial.33
Second, the evidence must be compelled.34 Third, the evidence must be
incriminating.35
1.

Fifth Amendment Evidence Must Be Testimonial

The Fifth Amendment normally protects defendants and witnesses
from incriminating themselves only through oral testimony. 36 The
production of physical documents potentially implicates the Fifth
Amendment in certain instances, even though physical evidence is
generally not protected.37 In Fisher v. United States,38 the U.S. Supreme
Court suggested that the act of production may be transformed into a
testimonial act when a defendant is required to determine which
documents to produce in response to a subpoena.39 However, the Court
identified another exception to the exception of transformed testimonial
production.40 If the records or documents whose existence, authenticity,
and possession or control by the defendant are a “foregone conclusion,”41
those documents are not entitled to testimonial status.42 Because the
documents do not have testimonial status, the defendant cannot invoke
Fifth Amendment protections in that instance.
2.

Fifth Amendment Evidence Must Be Compelled

Government agents may compel testimony at a court proceeding or
through questioning. The Miranda doctrine43 and associated extensive
32. See Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 155 (1958) (“A witness who is compelled to
testify . . . has no occasion to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination until testimony sought to
be elicited will in fact tend to incriminate.”).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976).
37. Id. at 409.
38. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
39. Id. at 411.
40. Id. at 391.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 411. The government must demonstrate, however, that the existence, possession, and
authenticity of the documents are all foregone conclusions. Id. at 411–13.
43. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (applying the right to silence to custodial
interrogations and balancing the rights of Americans versus the efficiency and efficacy of police
investigations to prevent crime). A person in custody “must be warned prior to any questioning that
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judicial history explore the nuances of statements made during custodial
interrogation and the application of the Fifth Amendment to those
circumstances. Testimony outside of custodial interrogations is compelled
if the witness faces the “cruel trilemma.”44 This trilemma occurs when a
witness believes there are only three choices in response to a question at
the time of questioning: (1) lie and be held liable for perjury; (2) refuse to
answer and be liable for contempt; or (3) answer truthfully and furnish
inculpatory evidence.45 An additional corollary to the “cruel trilemma” is
that the government may not use a defendant’s right to silence (including
a refusal to testify at trial) to assist in the prosecution.46 The U.S. Supreme
Court has also held that severe threats to an individual’s livelihood are
sufficiently compulsory to invoke the protections of the Fifth
Amendment, especially when the government employs the defendant.47
3.

Fifth Amendment Evidence Must Be Incriminating

In addition to being testimonial and compelled, Fifth Amendment
protected testimony must also be incriminating. Testimonial evidence
does not have to “support a conviction under a . . . criminal statute,” but
must only “furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed.”48 A court may
also extend Fifth Amendment privileges to statutes superficially
designated as civil sanctions if the statute’s purpose or intent is
sufficiently punitive.49 The courts will look to seven factors50 to determine
if proof exists that the statutory scheme has “transformed what was clearly
intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.”51 Likewise, the person
invoking the Fifth Amendment need not be on trial themselves, so long as
he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that
he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be
appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.” Id. at 479.
44. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
45. Id.
46. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965).
47. See, e.g., Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 76 (1973) (eligibility for government contract);
Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967) (employment as a police officer); Spevack v. Klein,
385 U.S. 511, 514 (1966) (disbarment); cf. McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 29 (2002) (incentivizing
admission during voluntary sex offender treatment program); Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard,
523 U.S. 272, 276 (1998) (declining to grant parole/clemency for death row inmate following silence
in response to a question at voluntary interview).
48. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951) (citing Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159
(1950)).
49. Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99 (1997).
50. Id. at 99–100; Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1963).
51. Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 154 (1956).
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there exists a reasonable danger of future prosecution;52 even a witness
proclaiming innocence may assert Fifth Amendment rights and invoke its
protections.53 The risk of incrimination may not be “of an imaginary and
unsubstantial character” or “some extraordinary and barely possible
contingency.”54
B.

Fifth Amendment Protections Are Not Absolute and May Be
Overcome

A witness’s or defendant’s testimony, even if compelled, testimonial,
and incriminating, may still fall outside the scope of Fifth Amendment
protection. First, a defendant may waive the protections of the Fifth
Amendment by voluntarily taking the stand as a defense witness.55 A
defendant or witness may not then invoke the Fifth Amendment upon
cross-examination “regarding matters made relevant by [their] direct
examination.”56 Likewise, a witness or defendant who has previously
failed to invoke Fifth Amendment rights and has given testimony may be
compelled to repeat such testimony as there is no new risk of incrimination
or prosecution.57 Additionally, testimony that is compelled but never acted
upon or offered as inculpatory evidence at trial does not violate a
defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights.58
More importantly for this Comment, even a well-founded and
reasonable fear of prosecution by a foreign jurisdiction is typically
disregarded, as the defendant generally cannot invoke the privileges of the
Fifth Amendment.59 In United States v. Balsys,60 the Court held that a
defendant may not invoke Fifth Amendment privileges if there is “no
valid fear of criminal prosecution in this country.”61 In this case, the Court

52. See Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486–87; Blau, 340 U.S. at 161; Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S.
547, 586 (1891).
53. Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17, 21–22 (2001) (per curiam).
54. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 599 (1896) (citing Queen v. Boyes (1861) 121 Eng. Rep. 730;
1 B. & S. 311).
55. Id.
56. Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 154 (1958).
57. See United States v. Allmon, 594 F.3d 981, 985 (8th Cir. 2010).
58. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990); In re Terrorist Bombings of
U.S. Embassies in E. Afr., 552 F.3d 177, 199 (2d Cir. 2008).
59. United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666 (1998), rev’g 119 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 1997). Both parties
agreed that the risk of deportation alone is insufficient for asserting Fifth Amendment protections. Id.
at 671.
60. 524 U.S. 666 (1998), rev’g 119 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 1997).
61. Id. at 671 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Balsys, 119 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 1997)).
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held that a resident alien could not refuse to testify about his alleged Nazi
activities during World War II, despite potentially subjecting him to
prosecution by the governments of Lithuania, Israel, and Germany. 62
However, the Court suggested that coordinated prosecutorial efforts
between the United States and foreign nations may develop to the point at
which the Fifth Amendment becomes applicable.63
C.

Grants of Immunity May Compel Testimony

The use of involuntary statements or testimony as evidence is strongly
limited. However, it may be permissible if the defendant or witness is
given a grant of immunity.
Courts have firmly maintained that confessions or other statements
introduced as evidence against a defendant must be voluntary, based on
both common law64 and judicial precedent.65 In Bram v. United States,66
the U.S. Supreme Court held that compelled, involuntary confessions
gathered by Canadian officials could not be used as evidence during a
trial.67 One hundred thirty years later, the Second Circuit affirmed the
same principles considered in Bram, holding that compulsory interviews
and statements provided to the Financial Conduct Authority of the United
Kingdom,68 and subsequently used by the U.S. Department of Justice
during prosecution, violated the defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights to
not serve as a witness against himself.69 As such, claims of voluntariness
are viewed skeptically, and the issue is most easily circumvented through
grants of immunity.
1.

There Are Three Types of Immunity Available to Compel Testimony

If the government considers a witness’s testimony especially relevant
or necessary, it may compel such testimony by granting statutorily

62. Id. at 670.
63. Id.
64. Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 545 (1897).
65. United States v. Allen, 864 F.3d 63, 90 (2d Cir. 2017).
66. 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
67. Bram, 168 U.S. at 565.
68. Allen, 864 F.3d at 66–68. The defendant’s refusal to testify would have resulted in
imprisonment in the United Kingdom. Additionally, the defendants were provided direct use
immunity. Id. at 67–68. However, the requisite derivative use immunity (discussed infra
section I.C.1) was not provided prior to the compulsory statements. Id.
69. Id. at 66–68.
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authorized immunity.70 There exist three types of immunity: (1) use
immunity; (2) use and derivative use immunity; and (3) transactional
immunity.71
First, the government may grant a witness or defendant use immunity.
Use immunity prohibits the introduction of the specific testimony the court
or government compels; however, it does not prohibit the exploitation of
such compelled testimony to seek out additional evidence against the
witness.72 The U.S. Supreme Court has held that such limited use
immunity is not coextensive with the protections afforded by the Fifth
Amendment, and therefore “cannot supplant the privilege, and is not
sufficient to compel testimony over a claim of the privilege.”73
A second option available is use and derivative use. Contrary to use
immunity alone, use and derivative use immunity prohibits the
introduction of any evidence gathered directly from the compelled
testimony, or subsequently derived either directly or indirectly “from such
testimony or other information.”74 Such grants of immunity are
considered coextensive with the protections afforded by the Fifth
Amendment and are therefore adequate to protect a witness’s rights when
testimony is compelled.75 Title 18 of the United States Code provides the
statutory means by which the federal government may grant immunity to
a witness before either House of Congress, a congressional committee, a
court, a grand jury, or an agency of the United States.76 If the government
pursues future prosecution following a grant of this type of immunity, the
government then assumes a “heavy burden of proving that all of the
evidence it proposes to use was derived from legitimate independent
sources.”77
The third, and most extensive, grant of immunity is transactional
immunity. Unlike the other two types of immunity, transactional
immunity provides protections broader than those of the Fifth
Amendment.78 Compared to use and derivative use immunity, which only
prohibits the direct or indirect use of the testimony provided,
transactional immunity “accords full immunity from prosecution for the
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 448 (1972).
Id. at 458.
Id. at 450.
Id. (discussing Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 586 (1891)).
Id. at 449 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (2012)).
Id. at 453.
18 U.S.C. § 6002 (immunity generally).
Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 461–62 (emphasis added).
Id. at 453.
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offense to which the compelled testimony relates,”79 regardless of the
source of the evidence sought to be introduced against the defendant.
Because transactional immunity provides greater protections than the
Fifth Amendment, it is sufficient to compel the self-incriminating
testimony of a witness.
2.

Grants of Immunity Are Binding Across Jurisdictions

The Fourteenth Amendment applies a defendant’s privilege against
self-incrimination to state proceedings,80 and state grants of immunity
must still comply with the constitutional limitations articulated by the U.S.
Supreme Court.81 In Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York
Harbor,82 the Court held that “the constitutional privilege against selfincrimination protects a state witness against incrimination under federal
as well as state law and a federal witness against incrimination under state
as well as federal law.”83 In other words, both federal and state prosecutors
are bound when either grants immunity, and are limited to using evidence
independent of compelled testimony. The Court considered the “witness
and Federal Government [to be] in substantially the same position as if
the witness had claimed his privilege in the absence of a state grant of
immunity,” without unnecessarily inhibiting the states’ law enforcement
or investigatory functions.84
Because of the mutually binding nature of grants of immunity, the
Department of Justice has implemented an agency-wide policy directing
U.S. Attorneys to consider potential adverse effects to concurrent
prosecutions prior to requesting or granting immunity.85
II.

THE COMPLICATED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES, THE SEVERAL STATES, INDIAN TRIBES,
AND THE RESPECTIVE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EACH

Indian tribes, as sovereign entities, preexisted the Constitution and the
United States. Through treaty making, legislative action, and judicial
decision, the scope of tribal sovereignty has fluctuated wildly from the
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964).
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 585–86 (1891).
378 U.S. 52 (1964).
Id. at 77–78.
Id. at 79.
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL § 720 (2018) [hereinafter CRIMINAL
RESOURCE MANUAL], https://www.justice.gov/jm/criminal-resource-manual-720-authorizationprocedure-immunity-requests [https://perma.cc/YAX8-LSUU].
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earliest days of interaction to present; so too has congressional and federal
authority to regulate tribal conduct. Indelibly connected with tribal
sovereignty, tribal jurisdiction also experienced periods of restriction and
restoration. Today’s tribal defendants face prosecution in numerous
tribunals, including tribal, federal, and state court, with no Double
Jeopardy limits. A push is also underway to provide traditional resolutions
or apply fundamental Indian law to tribal cases and continue jurisdictional
reversion to tribal courts.
A.

A Brief History of Indian Sovereignty and Intervention by the
Federal Government

There are 567 federally recognized tribes within the national
boundaries of the United States.86 These tribes are located on and exercise
jurisdiction over Indian country; Indian country includes reservations,
allotments, and dependent Indian communities.87 A federally recognized
tribe is an entity that has “a government-to-government relationship with
the United States . . . .”88 Further, federally recognized tribes are
understood to have “certain inherent rights of self-government (i.e., tribal
sovereignty),”89 each entitled to a “special brand of sovereignty.”90
Early interactions between the government of the United States and
Native American tribes demonstrated (at least superficial) respect for the
sovereignty of the tribes and Indian nations.91 In early decisions, the U.S.
Supreme Court recognized “those semi-independent tribes whom our
government has always recognized as exempt from our laws . . . and, in
regard to their domestic government, left to their own rules and
traditions.”92 Absent an explicit treaty provision or federal statute to the
contrary, Indian crime committed against other Indians was beyond the
jurisdiction of federal and state courts.93
Furthermore, in the absence of limited examples of delegation,
Congress reserved jurisdiction over Indian affairs to the federal
86. Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the Unites States Bureau of
Indian Affairs, 83 Fed. Reg. 4235, 4235 (Jan. 30, 2018).
87. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012) (defining Indian country).
88. Frequently Asked Questions: What Is a Federally Recognized Tribe?, U.S. DEP’T INTERIOR
INDIAN AFFS., https://www.bia.gov/frequently-asked-questions [https://perma.cc/CFS6-AEZY].
89. Id.
90. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 800 (2014).
91. See Robert Anderson, Negotiating Jurisdiction: Retroceding State Authority Over Indian
Country Granted by Public Law 280, 87 WASH. L. REV. 915, 920 (2012).
92. United States v. Joseph, 94 U.S. 614, 617 (1877).
93. See generally Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
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government.94 The Court explicitly rejected state attempts to exercise
jurisdiction over the conduct of non-Indians in Indian country.95 The
foundational principles for these holdings were three-fold: (1) that Indian
tribes “possess certain incidents of preexisting sovereignty”; (2) that this
“sovereignty is subject to diminution or elimination” only by the federal
government and not the states; and (3) that the “limited sovereignty and
their corresponding dependency upon the United States for protection”
imposed a responsibility on the federal government.96
Despite these claims and original principles, both legislative and
judicial action further curtailed tribal sovereignty and jurisdiction. In
1871, the federal government stopped making treaties with the tribes,
effectively ending tribal consent to the form of the tribes’ relationship
with the federal government.97 In passing the General Allotment Act of
1887,98 Congress assigned individual parcels to members of Indian tribes,
abrogating the traditional model of community ownership and “returning”
approximately 110 million acres of “surplus” territory to public (i.e., nonIndian) ownership.99 Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Ex
parte Crow Dog, and in response to the perceived inadequacy of the
traditional tribal means of conflict resolution,100 Congress passed the
Major Crimes Act (MCA).101 This statute granted to the federal courts
jurisdiction over Indians who committed any of the enumerated crimes
against other Indians in Indian Country.102
These legislative actions, specifically the MCA, were upheld as a
proper exercise of Congress’ plenary powers over the tribes.103 Because
of the tribes’ apparent dependence on the government of the United States,
the Court described the tribes as “wards of the nation.”104 The Court held
that “[t]he power of the General Government over [the tribes] . . . is
necessary to their protection, as well as to the safety of those among whom

94. See Anderson, supra note 91, at 929.
95. See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 562 (1832) (invalidating a Georgia statute
requiring non-Indians to have a state license to live on Indian land).
96. CONFERENCE OF WASH. ATT’YS GEN., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK § 1:1, at 7–8
(2017); DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 5, at 39.
97. Anderson, supra note 91, at 921.
98. Ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.).
99. Anderson, supra note 91, at 921.
100. Id. at 925–26.
101. Major Crimes Act, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 385 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2012)).
102. Id. (listing seven crimes; later amended to enumerate thirteen separate crimes).
103. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384–85 (1886).
104. Id. at 382, 383.
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they dwell.”105 This plenary power is recognized and upheld as a “broad
congressional authority to impose federal policy directly on tribes without
their consent,”106 especially with regards to “health, safety, and morals
within Indian country.”107 Congress also limited the sentencing authority
of the tribal courts, statutorily capping any sentence to one-year
imprisonment and a five thousand dollar fine.108
B.

The Shifting Scope of Tribal Jurisdiction

From the 1970s to early 2000s, the existing understanding of the Indian
tribes’ exclusive jurisdiction was limited by a series of court decisions,
while legislative efforts to circumscribe tribal authority were judicially
upheld. In Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe,109 the U.S. Supreme Court held
that Indian tribes do not have jurisdiction over non-tribal defendants for
crimes committed in Indian country.110 The Court also held in a separate
case that the tribes also could not regulate hunting and fishing activities
by non-tribal members on land owned in fee simple by non-Indians, even
if such land fell within the boundaries of the tribal reservation.111 In Strate
v. A-1 Contractors,112 the Court denied tribal jurisdiction over the civil
claims of two non-tribal parties, arising out of conduct occurring on a state
highway, on land transferred through a federal lease which crossed
through an Indian reservation.113 The Court also rejected a claim of civil
jurisdiction over state officials who entered onto reservation land to
execute a state search warrant.114
Despite these reductions in jurisdiction, recent legislative efforts and
judicial decisions are again extending the scope of tribal courts. First, in
Lara, the Court upheld a federal statute permitting tribal jurisdiction over
any member of any federally recognized tribe, even if the defendant is not
a member of the tribe hearing the case.115 Additionally, the Court
reaffirmed that the Double Jeopardy Clause posed no obstacle to
105. Id. at 384.
106. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 5-02, at 391 (Nell Jessup Newton ed., 2012)
[hereinafter COHEN’S HANDBOOK].
107. Id.
108. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012).
109. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
110. Id. at 195.
111. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566–67 (1981).
112. 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
113. Id. at 442.
114. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 374 (2001).
115. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 210 (2004).
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prosecutions under both tribal and federal law.116 Recent legislation, such
as the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act (VAWA 2013)117
and the Tribal Law and Order Act (TLOA),118 have also increased tribal
authority. For example, VAWA 2013 includes provisions extending the
jurisdiction of tribal courts to non-Indians, specifically in the context of
domestic violence prosecutions.119 Further, TLOA extended tribal
sentencing authority by permitting the “stacking” of numerous charges,
resulting in an effective sentence of nine years imprisonment and a fifteen
thousand dollar fine.120
C.

Concurrent Jurisdiction and the Intervention of Federal and State
Courts in Tribal Matters

When tribal members are not physically located in Indian country, they
are subject to the jurisdiction of both the state and federal governments.
However, even within the boundaries of Indian country, tribal members
may be subject to the jurisdiction of the tribes, the federal government,
and the state.121 For example, although “tribal powers may not be limited
by implication”122 and “concurrent tribal jurisdiction over matters covered
by federal criminal statutes is not preempted,”123 tribal members still
remain subject to federal jurisdiction under the MCA124 and the Indian
Country Crimes Act (ICCA).125 Additionally, some lower courts have
held that “the United States has jurisdiction over some general federal
criminal laws within Indian country”126 and that such “general crimes
have a nationwide scope and therefore should reach into Indian
country.”127

116. Id. at 210.
117. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, tit. IX, 127 Stat.
54, 118–26 (codified in scattered sections of 18, 25, and 42 U.S.C.).
118. Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, tit. II, 124 Stat. 2258, 2261–301
(codified in scattered sections of 25 and 42 U.S.C.).
119. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 § 904 (codified as 25 U.S.C. § 1304
(Supp. III 2015)).
120. Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010 § 234 (codified as 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012)).
121. See generally Anderson, supra note 91, at 924, 926, 930.
122. Id. at 927.
123. Id.
124. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2012). Indian defendants are therefore accountable for the fourteen
enumerated crimes (murder, arson, etc.). Id.
125. Id. § 1152 (assimilating state law crimes through the Assimilative Crimes Act).
126. Anderson, supra note 91, at 926.
127. Id.
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The line of reasoning employed by the U.S. Supreme Court in United
States v. Kagama,128 upholding Congress’s plenary authority to pass the
MCA,129 has yet to be overruled. In fact, the Court recently affirmed
Congress’s “broad general powers to legislate in respect to Indian
tribes.”130 The same general legislative attitude, as well as efforts to
terminate the federal trust relationship,131 brought about the passage of
Public Law 83-280 (PL 280).132 Congress exercised its plenary power,
mandating that some states assume jurisdiction over certain crimes
committed within Indian country; other states were presented the option
to assume jurisdiction.133 PL 280 requires six states to assert criminal, and
some civil, jurisdiction over Indian country located within the respective
state borders; other states could assert criminal and civil jurisdiction
unilaterally.134
In United States v. Wheeler,135 the Court held that prosecution under
both tribal and federal statutes did not implicate Double Jeopardy.136 First,
the tribes retained inherent powers to prosecute tribal members despite the
tribes’ dependent status with the federal government.137 Second, because
a “separate sovereign” brought each prosecution, the prosecution is not
“for the same offence.”138 The Ninth Circuit further refined this holding.
Acquittal under the MCA, the court held, did not prevent subsequent
prosecution by a tribal court for the same crime under a tribal statute.139
This application of the “separate sovereigns” doctrine to the tribes is
consistent with the Court’s application of the doctrine to the states. In

128. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
129. Id. at 384–85; supra section II.A.
130. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200–06 (2004) (offering six distinct points of discussion
for the basis of Congress’s authority).
131. Anderson, supra note 91, at 922.
132. State Jurisdiction over Criminal Offenses (PL 280), Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321–1322, 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2012)).
133. Id. Recall the Court’s holding in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832), that the states had
no jurisdiction within the boundaries of a reservation under the contemporaneous jurisprudence and
law. Id. at 562; supra text accompanying note 95. PL 280 legislatively overruled this precedent.
134. 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a); Anderson, supra note 91, at 930. See WASH. REV. CODE § 37.12 (2018)
as an example of Washington State’s assertion of jurisdiction over tribal matters. Note also that the
optional assumption of jurisdiction has been revoked, and states may request the United States accept
a retrocession of previously assumed jurisdiction. 25 U.S.C. § 1323.
135. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
136. Id. at 329–30.
137. Id. at 332.
138. Id. at 330.
139. Wetsit v. Stafne, 44 F.3d 823, 826 (9th Cir. 1995).
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Abbate v. United States,140 the Court held that a state conviction does not
bar prosecution under a federal statute.141 Further, states may prosecute
individuals previously charged under federal law.142 Successive
prosecutions by tribal, state, or federal courts are not barred as each
government is a separate sovereign, and the respective courts are not
“emanating” from the same sovereign.143
It is important to note that the U.S. Supreme Court recently held oral
arguments in the case of Gamble v. United States144; the sole question
presented is whether the “separate sovereigns” exception to the Double
Jeopardy Clause should be overruled.145 The Native Indigenous Women’s
Resource Center (NIWRC) and National Congress of American Indians
(NCAI) has strongly opposed such a holding.146 The NIWRC and NCAI
contend that eliminating the “separate sovereigns” exception would “only
further perpetuate the crisis Native women and children now face,”147 as
meaningful and sufficient punishment of domestic violence offenders
requires the availability of federal prosecution in addition to tribal
sanctions.148 Arguably, tribes would be left with two choices: (1) wait for
a decision on federal prosecution, potentially exceeding the tribal statute
of limitations, or (2) bring tribal charges (with limited sentencing) to the
exclusion of federal prosecution.149 Furthermore, NIWRC and NCAI
argue that any disruption of the “separate sovereigns” exception should
not extend to tribal prosecutions, as the Double Jeopardy Clause is a
federal constitutional question and is therefore inapplicable.150
Additionally, the incorporation of the Double Jeopardy Clause in ICRA is
140. 359 U.S. 187 (1959).
141. Id. at 196. However, see the Department of Justice’s “Petite Policy,” articulating several
factors and considerations prior to commencing a prosecution of an individual who has proceeded
through the criminal justice process in a state court. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE MANUAL § 92.031 (2018) [hereinafter JUSTICE MANUAL], https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-2000-authority-usattorney-criminal-division-mattersprior-approvals#9-2.031 [https://perma.cc/2TQ7-26L8].
142. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 139 (1959).
143. Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U.S. 253, 264 (1937) (permitting concurrent territorial and
federal anti-trust law).
144. 694 F. App’x 750 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 2707 (2018) (No.
17-646).
145. Brief for Petitioner at i, Gamble v. United States, No. 17-646 (U.S. Sept. 4, 2018).
146. Brief of Amicus Curiae National Indigenous Women’s Resource Center & National Congress
of American Indians in Support of Respondent at 10, Gamble v. United States, No. 17-646 (U.S. Nov.
1, 2018).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 16.
149. Id. at 17.
150. Id. at 27.

18 - Kunze(2).docx (Do Not Delete)

2156

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

1/6/2019 12:55 PM

[Vol. 93:2139

arguably limited only to duplicative tribal prosecutions, as it does not
explicitly bar subsequent state or federal prosecution.151
Ultimately, while a positive result for the petitioner in Gamble may
have momentous implications on tribal prosecutions, it does not resolve
the question of what standard should be applied to ICRA provisions
mirroring the Bill of Rights.
D.

Contemporaneous Efforts to Apply Traditional Methods or
Fundamental Indian Law to Tribal Jurisdictions and to Revert
Control of Tribal Systems to Indian Tribes

Traditional tribal punishments, remedies, and purpose are significantly
different from Anglo-Saxon criminal justice systems.152 Tribal
fundamental law is “something that existed before Western style courts
and [is] something that still exists beyond the court setting.”153 Because
tribes are sovereign, they are not only empowered and entitled to
“[administer] justice for the community,” but are also responsible for it.154
Before the imposition of European and American standards of justice
on tribal courts, one of the most essential functions exercised by a tribal
government “involved the resolution of disputes among tribal
members.”155 Compared to a contemporary focus on guilt and
punishment, the “primary goal was simply to mediate the case to
everyone’s satisfaction.”156 Although a chief, elder, or other leader was
generally responsible for the proceeding, the parties had to “discuss the
problem until a satisfactory compromise or solution could be agreed
upon.”157 The peace and functioning of the tribe remained the overarching
goal, even though the tribe might also punish an offender (up to and
including banishment or death).158

151. Id. at 28 (discussing 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(3) (2012)); see also Robert Berry, Civil Liberties
Constraints on Tribal Sovereignty After the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 1 J.L. & POL’Y 1, 26
(1993) (“Congress was deliberate in the silences it left in ICRA.”).
152. CARRIE E. GARROW & SARAH DEER, TRIBAL CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 16 (Jerry
Gardner ed., 2004).
153. April L. Wilkinson, A Framework for Understanding Tribal Courts and the Application of
Fundamental Law: Through the Voices of Scholars in the Field of Tribal Justice, 15 TRIBAL L.J. 67,
69–70 (2015).
154. Id. at 71.
155. DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 5, at 111.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 112.
158. GARROW & DEER, supra note 152, at 16–18.
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Application of modern constitutional law, especially Fifth Amendment
protections, is further complicated by a difference in cultural values
between many Indian philosophies of justice and the Anglo-American
judicial system.159 For example, some cultures such as the Mohawk,
banished members who were found guilty a third time of lying or
minimizing their own culpable behavior.160 The tribe imposed a “cultural
requirement of full disclosure” entirely contrary to an Anglo-American
right to remain silent in order to support rehabilitation and the integrity of
the community as a whole.161
As tribal justice systems continue to develop, each has adopted a
unique format.162 Some courts implement Anglo-American formats, to
include trained lawyers and judges practicing adversarial law in
courtrooms, with an emphasis on, and incorporation of, fundamental
law.163 Tribal fundamental law is defined as the “tradition, customs, [and]
tribal values” incorporated into a tribal court.164 Others offer a mix of
Western and traditional Indian forums, staffing both adversarial criminal
courts and dispute resolution venues.165 The third type of tribal system
relies solely on traditional methods and fundamental laws, to the point a
written code may not be available.166
Efforts are currently underway to facilitate a continued transfer of
responsibility and authority to the tribal courts.167 Government
committees,168 tribal organizations,169 and academics170 champion these
efforts. Recommendations include the return of jurisdiction assumed as a
product of PL 280,171 substantial increases in funding for tribal justice

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id. at 243.
Id. at 244.
Id.
See generally Wilkinson, supra note 153, at 69–80.
Id. at 76.
Id. at 70.
Id. at 78.
Id.
See generally INDIAN LAW & ORDER COMM’N, A ROADMAP FOR MAKING NATIVE AMERICA
SAFER: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES (2013) [hereinafter
INDIAN LAW & ORDER COMM’N].
168. Id.
169. INDIGENOUS
PEACEMAKING
INITIATIVE,
https://peacemaking.narf.org/
[https://perma.cc/8RJV-GBVE].
170. INDIAN LAW & ORDER COMM’N, supra note 167; Anderson, supra note 91.
171. The optional and unilateral assumption of jurisdiction by states was repealed with the passage
of ICRA. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 106, § 1-07.
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systems,172 and the creation of a separate U.S. Court of Indian Appeals.173
Likewise, courts have adopted a policy to engage in statutory
interpretation in favor of tribal sovereignty in the case of federal statutes
with ambiguous congressional intent that impose upon tribal rights,
systems, or laws.174
III. THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AND JUDICIALLY
IMPOSED FEDERAL UNDERSTANDING OF INDIAN
RIGHTS
Congress passed ICRA in 1968, and statutorily mandated the
application of certain fundamental rights to tribal defendants. Many of
these rights are similar to or verbatim from the Bill of Rights, yet courts
across tribal, federal, and state jurisdictions disagree as to the proper
standard of analysis and the applicability of federal precedent in
interpreting constitutional rights.
A.

Judicial and Legislative History Leading to the Adoption of the
ICRA

Assuming tribal members meet federal standards for citizenship,175 as
well as the membership requirements of a federally recognized tribe,176
Indians are simultaneous citizens of three distinct and sovereign entities:
the tribe, the state, and the United States.177 However, within Indian
country, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments do not apply to the actions
of tribal governments.178 In fact, because tribes pre-date the signing of the
Constitution, it is not binding and tribes retain their “historic sovereign
authority.”179 However, tribes that wish to implement similar rights may

172. INDIAN LAW & ORDER COMM’N, supra note 167, at xiv–xv, xvii–xix, xxiii–xxiv.
173. Id. at 23–24.
174. See generally Ramah Navajo School Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue of N.M., 458 U.S. 832 (1982);
McClanahan v. State Tax Comm’n of Ariz., 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
175. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-175, § 233, 43 Stat.
253.
176. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 52–55, 52 n.2 (1978) (affirming District
Court’s emphasis on the importance of tribal control over membership requirements); Roff v. Burney,
168 U.S. 218, 223 (1897).
177. DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 5, at 217–18.
178. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896). The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments do apply
to the actions of state and federal government actors exercising lawful jurisdiction within Indian
country. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 371 (2001).
179. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 788 (2014).
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do so in tribal constitutions, or Congress may exercise its plenary powers
to impose such rights statutorily.180
In an effort described as a push to “grant the American Indians the
rights which are secured to other Americans,”181 Senator Sam Ervin
became the chief sponsor of ICRA.182 Over a seven-year period, Senator
Ervin held hearings to address a long line of court cases affirming the
inapplicability of the Constitution to the tribes.183 In Santa Clara Pueblo
v. Martinez,184 the U.S. Supreme Court engaged in an extensive review of
the legislative history of ICRA, finding Congressional intent to “promote
the well-established federal policy of further Indian self-government” and
protecting “tribal sovereignty from undue influence.”185 The Court also
held that extending an unenumerated remedy beyond habeas corpus was
“not plainly required to give effect to Congress’ objective of extending
constitutional norms to tribal self-government.”186 In conducting its own
review of the legislative history, the Ninth Circuit cited with approval the
statements of Representative Benjamin Reifel,187 that “habeas corpus
under ICRA ‘would assure effective enforcement of . . . fundamental trial
rights’ that arise in the criminal context, including the prohibition on
double jeopardy, the privilege against self-incrimination, and the right to
confront witnesses.”188
B.

Protections Afforded by ICRA, and the Judicial Review Available
for Violations

Much of the language of the ICRA is similar, though not necessarily
identical, to that of the Bill of Rights. In relevant part, ICRA provides that
“[n]o Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government
shall . . . compel any person in any criminal case to be a witness against
180. Tavares v. Whitehouse, 851 F.3d 863, 869–70 (9th Cir. 2017).
181. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 106, § 1-07.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
185. Id. at 62–63.
186. Id. at 65.
187. Representative Reifel was a Representative for the state of South Dakota from 1961 to 1971.
Representative Reifel was born on the Rosebud Indian Reservation in South Dakota and was an area
administrator with the Bureau of Indian Affairs prior to his political career. Biographical Directory
of the United States Congress, 1774–Present, Reifel, Benjamin, (1906 - 1990), U.S. CONG.
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=R000152
[https://perma.cc/ETQ4XDWY].
188. Tavares v. Whitehouse, 851 F.3d 863, 873 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing 114 CONG. REC. 9611
(1968)).
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himself.”189 Additional rights protected by ICRA include freedom of
speech, protections against unreasonable searches and seizures, and
protection against takings without compensation.190
However, unlike the federal judicial system, the only means of
achieving a remedy for violations of ICRA rest within the tribal justice
systems,191 or upon a writ of habeas corpus.192 In Martinez, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that only habeas corpus suits permitted federal review
of tribal court holdings.193 According to the Court, tribal sovereign
immunity barred an action against the tribe itself and was not limited by
an exercise of Congress’ plenary power.194 Likewise, action against tribal
officials is not coextensive with the remedies available against state or
federal officers, such as an Ex parte Young claim, due to the unique
relationship between the United States and tribes.195 In the absence of
express authorization, the Court declined to imply an additional federal
cause of action beyond habeas review. The Ninth Circuit further narrowed
the availability of review, holding that initiation of federal habeas corpus
review required actual detention, rather than the broader understanding of
custody used in federal courts.196
C.

Imposed Federal Understandings of Indian Rights and the
Application of Constitutional Precedent

The U.S. Supreme Court has not resolved the issue of what precedent
to apply to (nearly) identical language between ICRA and the
Constitution. As such, it has fallen to the lower federal courts to determine
the constitutional boundaries of ICRA; in the process, these courts have
imposed a federal perspective and precedent on laws and rights solely
applicable to the Indian tribes.
Relying heavily on the nearly identical nature of the search and seizure
language, both the Eighth and Ninth Circuits of Appeals have applied
Fourth Amendment precedent to ICRA’s protections against unreasonable
189. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(4) (2012); cf. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person . . . shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”).
190. 25 U.S.C. § 1302.
191. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 65 (1978).
192. 25 U.S.C. § 1303.
193. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 67.
194. Id. at 58–59. For an extensive discussion on the scope and origins of tribal immunity, see Seth
W.R. Brickey, Comment, Rent a Tribe: Using Tribal Immunity to Shield Patents from Administrative
Review, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1449, 1455–74 (2018).
195. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 71.
196. Tavares v. Whitehouse, 851 F.3d 863, 872–73, 877 (9th Cir. 2017).
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searches and seizures.197 For example, in United States v. Clifford,198 the
Eighth Circuit applied a federal reasonableness standard to the search and
seizure conducted by tribal police officers arresting a tribal member on a
reservation, prior to the defendant’s prosecution in federal court.199 As in
Clifford, the parties in United States v. Becerra-Garcia200 briefed the case
as a Fourth Amendment matter, although the violation was committed by
tribal rangers on tribal land.201 Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit proceeded
“under well developed Fourth Amendment precedent, which nets the
same result as an analysis under ICRA.”202
The courts of appeals have also applied federal constitutional standards
to due process violation claims. The Ninth Circuit held in Randall v.
Yakima Nation Tribal Court203 that, so long as the criminal procedures of
a tribe do not “differ significantly from those ‘commonly employed in
Anglo-Saxon society[,]’ . . . federal constitutional standards are employed
in determining whether the challenged procedure violates the Act.”204
Directly citing the Ninth Circuit opinion in Randall, the Sixth Circuit held
in accord that ICRA’s due process protections required application of U.S.
Supreme Court precedent establishing the protection of fair notice.205
D.

Various Tribal Courts Apply Federal Fifth Amendment Law to
ICRA Self-Incrimination

In interpreting ICRA’s self-incrimination protections, several tribal
courts have looked to the tribal statutes requiring rights advisements and
analyzed them under a Fifth Amendment lens.206 For example, in Quileute

197. United States v. Becerra-Garcia, 397 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v.
Clifford, 664 F.2d 1090, 1091 n.3 (8th Cir. 1981); United States v. Lester, 647 F.2d 869, 872 (8th Cir.
1981).
198. 664 F.2d 1090 (8th Cir. 1981).
199. Id. at 1092 (applying an “expectation of privacy” test to the case at hand). The court did note
that while both parties’ arguments addressed Fourth Amendment concerns, ICRA was the controlling
law; the distinction was ultimately irrelevant, however, as the analysis was the same pursuant to
Lester. Id. at 1091 n.3.
200. 397 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 2005).
201. Id. at 1171.
202. Id. (“[T]he Indian Civil Rights Act . . . imposes an ‘identical limitation’ on tribal government
conduct as the Fourth Amendment.” (citation omitted)).
203. 841 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1988).
204. Id. at 900.
205. Kelsey v. Pope, 809 F.3d 849, 864 (6th Cir. 2016).
206. Robert J. McCarthy, Civil Rights in Tribal Courts: The Indian Bill of Rights at Thirty Years,
34 IDAHO L. REV. 465, 499 (1998).
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Tribe v. LeClair,207 the tribal court held procedural due process required
a defendant to not only have certain rights, but also “reasonably
understand those rights and have reasonable opportunities to exercise
those rights.”208 The same court also recognized in Southern Ute v.
Henry209 that the Fifth Amendment, while inapplicable to the tribes
directly, did share language with the relevant tribal statute provision that
“is almost identical.”210 Likewise, the court looked to the Fifth
Amendment and Miranda when analyzing the “Tribe’s code provisions
that address the issue of proper warnings where a person is subjected to a
custodial interrogation.”211 The Chippewa-Ottawa Conservation Court
also looked to Miranda as a guide in interpreting ICRA and tribal
statutes.212 Ultimately, even assuming that Miranda and related precedent
were binding, the court held rights advisements were not required for
adjudication of major civil infractions.213
The Fort Peck Court of Appeals was much more explicit about the
coextensive nature of the Fifth Amendment and ICRA’s selfincrimination protections. In Fort Peck Tribes v. Bighorn,214 the court held
that both the Fifth Amendment and ICRA mandated that law enforcement,
when taking tribal members into custody, advise those defendants of tribal
rights.215 The court also looked directly to the U.S. Supreme Court
precedent to determine whether the defendant in the case was “‘in
custody’ for purposes of receiving [Miranda] protection.”216 The Supreme
Court of the Muskogee (Creek) Nation also held that, under the U.S.
Constitution, ICRA, and the tribal code, asking a defendant under oath
about Indian enrollment status violated the privilege against self-

207. 1 NICS App. 50 (Quileute Tribal Ct. App. 1989).
208. Id. at 54.
209. 15 NICS App. 35 (Southern Ute Tribal Ct. App. 2017) (per curiam).
210. Id. at 38.
211. Id.; accord Lower Elwha Klallam Indian Tribe v. Bolstrom, 19 Indian L. Rep. 6026, 6027
(Lower Elwha Klallam Ct. App. 1991) (describing the tribal statute as “essentially a statutory list of
the decision of Miranda v. Arizona” and then applying U.S. Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit
precedent as guidance to determine the proper remedy).
212. Chippewa-Ottawa Tribes v. Payment, Jr., 18 Indian L. Rep. 6141, 6141 (Chippewa-Ottawa
Conservation Ct. 1991).
213. Id. at 6141–42.
214. No. 279, 1999 Mont. Fort Peck Tribe LEXIS 4 (Fort Peck Ct. App. Nov. 5, 1999).
215. Id. at *4.
216. Id.; accord Southern Ute Tribe v. Lansing, 19 Indian L. Rep. 6091, 6092 (Southern Ute Tribal
Ct. 1992) (applying U.S. Supreme Court and Eighth Circuit precedent to the statutory language of “in
custody”).
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incrimination.217 This is because tribal enrollment is a necessary element
for jurisdiction and prosecution.218
However, not all tribal courts agree that Miranda warnings are
necessary under ICRA. For example, in Chippewa-Ottawa v. Payment
Jr.,219 the court left open the possibility that Miranda warnings are not
required by ICRA, even while assuming Miranda applied to rule against
the defendant.220 Other tribal courts have taken a more middle of the road
approach. The Crow Court of Appeals recognized that Miranda is not
binding, but also noted that the Ninth Circuit precedent in Randall would
suggest applying the federal constitutional law in analyzing ICRA’s selfincrimination clause.221 Instead, the court chose to forego applying ICRA
to the case at hand and instead resolved the issue more narrowly by
reviewing “the intent of the Tribal Council in enacting the requirement for
Miranda warnings under Tribal law.”222
E.

Accepting the Binding Nature of Grants of Immunity Across Tribal,
State and Federal Courts

Although rare, some courts have considered the effect of grants of
immunity on cross-jurisdictional prosecutions involving tribal courts. In
In re Long Visitor,223 the Indian appellants were held in contempt by a
district court for failing to testify before a federal grand jury investigating
the shooting death of three people on the Pine Ridge Reservation,
including two Federal Bureau of Investigation agents.224 The appellants
were twice granted use immunity in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 6003,
and twice refused to testify.225 After being remanded to the custody of the
U.S. Marshals, the appellants filed their appeal, arguing that the grant of
immunity was inadequate to protect them from future use of their grand
jury testimony in tribal court prosecutions.226 The Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals dismissed the defendants’ claim as premature and speculative;
217. Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Johnson, SC 11-13, 2013 Muscogee Creek Nation Sup. LEXIS
2, at *32–33 (Muscogee (Creek) Nation Sup. Ct. Aug. 15, 2013).
218. Id. at *31–32.
219. 18 Indian L. Rep. 6141 (Chippewa-Ottawa Conservation Ct. 1991).
220. Id. at 6141.
221. Crow Tribe v. Big Man, No. 00-410, 2000 Mont. Crow Tribe LEXIS 5, at *19–26 (Crow Ct.
App. Oct. 12, 2000).
222. Id. at *29.
223. 523 F.2d 443 (8th Cir. 1975).
224. Id. at 444.
225. Id. at 445.
226. Id. at 445–46.
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however, the court also implied that the tribal courts would not be able to
use compelled testimony because ICRA “expressly protects an Indian
from self-incrimination.”227
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Arizona suggested in dicta that,
because the language of ICRA mirrors that of the Fifth Amendment, the
non-Indian petitioner would be able to invoke a privilege coextensive with
the Bill of Rights during testimony in a tribal court.228 In Tracy v. Superior
Court of Maricopa County,229 although the Navajo court could not
criminally try the non-Indian petitioner, the tribe nevertheless sought to
compel his testimony in a different criminal case.230 Upon request from
the tribal court and pursuant to an applicable state statute, the state
superior court ordered the petitioner to appear before the Navajo Nation
court.231 The petitioner claimed that his testimony as a witness in a Navajo
court would provide incriminating evidence for a pending federal
prosecution against him.232 The petitioner also contended that the
protections of ICRA against self-incrimination are inferior to state and
federal safeguards.233 The Supreme Court of Arizona emphasized that
those “provisions of the ICRA that clearly mirror the federal provisions in
language and intent . . . have been interpreted under the federal standard
and are generally held to be identical to their federal counterparts”234;
accordingly, the court held that ICRA “could not be interpreted to provide
any lesser protection.”235 The court hypothesized that the petitioner would
“enjoy a federally imposed privilege against self-incrimination that is
substantially coextensive with the fifth amendment privilege” and the
tribal court could not compel the petitioner’s testimony “without a grant
of use and derivative use immunity sufficient to meet the dictates of the
fifth amendment.”236
At least one tribal court has squarely addressed the issue of previous
grants of immunity by non-tribal jurisdictions. In Navajo Nation v.
MacDonald Jr.,237 the Navajo Nation prosecuted the defendant following
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

Id. at 447.
Tracy v. Superior Court of Maricopa Cty., 810 P.2d 1030, 1048 (Ariz. 1991).
810 P.2d 1030 (Ariz. 1991).
Id. at 1033.
Id. at 1033–34.
Id. at 1046.
Id. at 1047.
Id. at 1047–48.
Id. at 1048.
Id.
19 Indian L. Rep. 6079 (Navajo Nation Sup. Ct. 1992).

18 - Kunze(2).docx (Do Not Delete)

2018]

REMAINING SILENT IN INDIAN COUNTRY

1/6/2019 12:55 PM

2165

televised and otherwise publicly broadcasted immunized testimony before
a congressional committee.238 First, the court held that the tribal
prosecutor failed to prove to the court that evidence used in prosecuting
the trial was not directly based on or derived from the defendant’s
immunized testimony.239 Second, the court determined that this failure
violated the defendant’s due process rights articulated in the Navajo
Nation Bill of Rights.240 Relying on the concept that “[t]he right against
self-incrimination is fundamental” and is a Navajo principle espoused in
tribal law, the court affirmatively designated the safeguards articulated in
Kastigar v. United States241 as the appropriate standard by which to
evaluate prosecutions following immunized testimony.242
F.

Academic and Tribal Resistance to Adopting Federal Standards of
Analysis for ICRA Violations.

As previously identified, the voluminous U.S. Supreme Court
decisions interpreting the Bill of Rights are merely “a guide in Indian
country, not the law,” and may be followed or ignored at will by tribal
courts.243 The Court has recognized the “definite trend by tribal courts
toward the view that they have leeway in interpreting the
ICRA’s . . . clauses and need not follow the U.S. Supreme Court
precedents jot-for-jot.”244 Likewise, tribal courts are free to apply ICRA
to provide “essential fairness” consistent with tribal traditions and
circumstances.245
Some commentators suggest that the ambiguous deference to tribal
courts in interpreting the provisions of ICRA has both failed to protect the
constitutional rights of Indians and failed to empower tribes to protect
civil rights.246 Professor Robert Porter posited that the provisions of ICRA

238. MacDonald Jr., 19 Indian L. Rep. at 6083–84. Interestingly, this was the case for which the
petitioner in Tracy v. Superior Court of Maricopa County, discussed supra notes 228–236, was
compelled to testify.
239. Id. at 6084.
240. Id.
241. 406 U.S. 441, 461 (1972).
242. MacDonald Jr., 19 Indian L. Rep. at 6084.
243. GARROW & DEER, supra note 152, at 248.
244. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 384 (2001) (Souter, J., concurring).
245. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 106, § 14-04 n.63.
246. Note, ICRA Reconsidered: New Interpretations of Familiar Rights, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1709,
1720 (2016) (“[I]f Congress instead is trying to empower tribes to protect civil rights in their own
way, the uncertainty surrounding ICRA is causing tribes to hesitate and some federal courts to return
to federal jurisprudence as a guide to ICRA’s provisions.”).
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were an intentional and not so subtle continuation of Congress’s “100year attack on traditional methods of governance and dispute resolution”
by shifting a tribal court’s focus to the individual and away from the
community.247 Application of U.S. Supreme Court precedent would only
further impose “the strictures of Anglo-American law.”248 Additional
suggestions include the idea that federal courts, despite the similarity in
language to the Bill of Rights, decline to follow federal understandings of
constitutional rights; rather, the court should ensure that tribal “practice
accords with a permissible understanding” of that right.249 This approach
is arguably consistent with tribal culture and supports the idea of comity;
the sovereign nature of the tribes also supports such latitude.250 Further,
as noted in Harvard Law Review, permitting federal interpretation of
ICRA in federal court and tribal interpretation of ICRA in tribal court
leaves tribes with three stark choices: impose shorter sentences “to
maintain their tribal rights and distinctions, adapt to federal standards, or
have their judgments vacated by the federal government.”251
IV. THE SELF-INCRIMINATION PROTECTIONS OF ICRA
SHOULD BE ANALYZED UNDER, AND HELD AS COEXTENSIVE WITH, FIFTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS
Application of federal Fifth Amendment precedent is necessary to
ensure a degree of predictability and consistency between tribal, federal,
and state courts in hearing the cases of tribal defendants. Further, tribal
court decisions have demonstrated a willingness to adopt a uniform
standard of analysis, as well as compatibility between federal precedent
and tribes utilizing an Anglo-American trial system. The availability of
habeas corpus review by a federal court also recommends applying a
consistent federal standard to self-incrimination protections. Lastly, even
without changes to the current analysis, tribal prosecution poses a
247. Robert B. Porter, Strengthening Tribal Sovereignty Through Peacemaking: How the AngloAmerican Legal Tradition Destroys Indigenous Societies, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 235, 272
(1997); see also Hayley Weedn, Stay Out of the Cookie Jar: Revisiting Martinez to Explain Why the
U.S. Should Keep Its Hands out of Tribal Constitutionalism and Internal Self-Governance, 20
WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 18, 41–43 (2012).
248. Porter, supra note 247, at 272.
249. Note, supra note 246, at 1723.
250. Id. at 1724–28. See also Berry, supra note 151, at 31 (rejecting efforts at expanding the
jurisdiction of federal courts to hear ICRA claims as “no clearer path lies to furthering [Congress’s]
dual interests in tribal sovereignty and civil liberties than in allowing the tribal courts to develop an
autonomous body of civil liberties law that can synthesize tribal principles with the principles
embodied in the Constitution”).
251. Note, supra note 246, at 1724.
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sufficient risk to a defendant’s liberty to warrant self-incrimination
protections in other courts.
A.

Broad Tribal Jurisdiction Demonstrates the Need for a Uniform
and Consistent Interpretation of ICRA’s Protections

There are more than 560 tribal nations within the United States of
America,252 and each tribe is entitled (but not required) to create its own
constitution and criminal justice system.253 Each constitution is unique,
varied, and does not necessarily extend the same explicit protections to
tribal members.254 As a remedy, ICRA purported to extend basic
constitutional protections to tribal defendants. However, each tribal court
remains free to interpret and apply ICRA’s protections as it deems
appropriate, resulting in a patchwork of “constitutional” protections.
While this may have been an initially acceptable and workable state of
affairs, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Lara and the passage by
Congress of the VAWA 2013 demands the application of a singular
standard.
In Lara, the Court upheld Congress’s plenary power to extend tribal
court jurisdiction to any enrolled member of any federally recognized
tribe.255 The Court also held that Double Jeopardy did not apply to
prosecutions under both federal and tribal law.256 While defendants across
the nation must look to precedent for the respective charging jurisdiction,
all can rely on the Court’s decisions and interpretations of the
Constitution; tribal defendants are not afforded such predictability. It is
unnecessarily burdensome and counter to the express intent of Congress
in passing ICRA for defendants to determine the extent of rights and
privileges after crossing each jurisdictional boundary.257
252. See supra note 86.
253. Organization of Indian Tribes, 25 U.S.C. § 476 (2012).
254. Compare 1 N.N.C. §§ 1–9 (Navajo Nation Bill of Rights), with Tulalip Const. art. VII,
https://www.codepublishing.com/WA/Tulalip/ [https://perma.cc/EA99-42H5] (Tulalip Bill of
Rights).
255. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 197–98 (2004) (emphasis added). The U.S. Supreme
Court initially held that tribal courts did not have jurisdiction over nonmembers in Duro v. Reina, 495
U.S. 676 (1990). The Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1301(4), legislatively remedied such lack
of jurisdiction and was upheld as a proper relaxation by Congress of politically imposed restrictions
upon the tribes. Lara, 541 U.S. at 196.
256. Lara, 541 U.S. at 210.
257. Take, for example, western Washington: there are twenty different recognized tribes within
the Puget Sound watershed alone. Native American Tribes of the Puget Sound Watershed,
ENCYCLOPEDIA
PUGET
SOUND
(2018),
https://www.eopugetsound.org/terms/212
[https://permacc/SP68-Q6B2]. An enrolled tribal member driving from Bellingham to Quinault
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The passage of VAWA 2013 extended the jurisdiction of tribal courts
to non-Indians who committed domestic violence on tribal reservations.258
This was statutorily achieved by amending the language of ICRA. 259 To
exercise VAWA 2013 jurisdiction, tribes are required to extend all
constitutional protections necessary for “Congress to recognize and affirm
the inherent power of the participating tribe to exercise special domestic
violence criminal jurisdiction over the defendant.”260 However, VAWA
2013 speaks primarily to general due process requirements and not
specifically to Fifth Amendment self-incrimination protections. The
explicit recognition of the right to jury trials and the cross-reference to
due process rights articulated under TLOA in the event of confinement
supports this conclusion.261 Further, a non-Indian defendant over whom
tribes exercise extended jurisdiction under VAWA 2013 is still subject to
the concurrent jurisdiction of state and federal courts.262 Unlike tribal
members in Indian country, to whom the Constitution does not apply,263
non-Indian defendants subject to a tribal court’s jurisdiction due to
charges of domestic violence are still entitled to Constitutional
protections. Although unclear, the language of VAWA suggests that a
tribal court must extend standard constitutional protections to a tribal
defendant charged under VAWA statutes, meaning those rights and
privileges enumerated in the Bill of Rights as interpreted by the U.S.
Supreme Court.
If a tribal court were to extend a federal understanding of selfincrimination protection to a non-Indian defendant, and yet hold ICRA to
not be co-extensive, a tribal defendant charged with the same crime as a
non-tribal defendant would be entitled to different protections. This dualaround the Olympic Peninsula could be subject to seventeen different tribal jurisdictions along the
route, each one with an independently achieved interpretation of ICRA and unique self-incrimination
protections.
258. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, tit. IX, § 904, 127
Stat. 54, 122 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1304 (Supp. III 2015) (effective Jan. 3, 2016)); see
also TRIBAL LAW AND POLICY INST., TRIBAL LEGAL CODE RESOURCE: TRIBAL LAWS
IMPLEMENTING TLOA ENHANCED SENTENCING AND VAWA ENHANCED JURISDICTION 40 (Mar.
2016)
[hereineafter
TRIBAL
LEGAL
CODE
RESOURCE],
http://www.tribalinstitute.org/download/codes/TLOA_VAWA_3-9-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/8LZQ-PD8N].
259. See 25 U.S.C. § 1304; Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 § 904.
260. 25 U.S.C. § 1304(d)(4).
261. TRIBAL LEGAL CODE RESOURCE, supra note 258, at 17–18. For example, in the event of
incarceration, tribal courts are required to ensure effective assistance of counsel, provide counsel for
indigent defendants, and publish tribal laws, rules of evidence and rules of criminal procedure, among
others. Id.
262. 25 U.S.C. § 1304 (b)(2).
263. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896).
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level of protection unnecessarily complicates proceedings for the courts,
defendants, and attorneys; it is also blatantly contrary to the congressional
intent underlying ICRA to extend the same rights to every tribal
defendant. A tribe is also unlikely to make the policy decision to provide
required protections to non-Indians yet deny them to tribal citizens
charged with the same crime.264
B.

Tribal Court Precedent Strongly Suggests Adopting a Uniform
Interpretation of ICRA’s Self-Incrimination Protections

Various tribal jurisdictions have held ICRA’s protections against selfincrimination to be coextensive with the Fifth Amendment.265
Persuasively, the Northwest Intertribal Court System Court of Appeals,
which covers fifteen independent tribes and court systems, and one of the
only intertribal court systems in the United States,266 suggested that tribal
statutes passed pursuant to ICRA and offering rights advisements are,
without further legislative history, intended to abide by Miranda and the
Fifth Amendment.267 Likewise, the Fort Peck Tribe Court of Appeals
considered ICRA and the Fifth Amendment concurrently and equally in
articulating the applicable rule of law, and held that neither dictated a
rights advisement for voluntary incriminating statements.268 Most
explicitly, the Navajo Nation Supreme Court held that ICRA’s protections
against self-incrimination required Miranda-like rights advisements as
required by the Fifth Amendment. 269
The Supreme Court of Arizona also concluded, because of the identical
language of the Fifth Amendment and ICRA, that a defendant in tribal
court is entitled to invoke a privilege against self-incrimination
coextensive with the Bill of Rights.270 Because Arizona is home to the
majority of the Navajo reservation and its well-developed tribal court

264. See TRIBAL LEGAL CODE RESOURCE, supra note 258, at 40, 43–52 (offering various examples
of tribal codes implementing the VAWA 2013 changes).
265. Infra Part III.
266. NORTHWEST
INTERTRIBAL
CT.
SYS.,
https://www.nics.ws/about.html
[https://perma.cc/6GYH-K9DP].
267. Southern Ute v. Henry, 15 NICS App. 35, 38 (Southern Ute Tribal Ct. App. 2017) (per
curiam).
268. Fort Peck Tribes v. Bighorn, No. 279, 1999 Mont. Fort Peck Tribe LEXIS 4, at *3 (Fort Peck
Ct. App. Nov. 5, 1999).
269. Navajo Nation v. Rodriguez, No. SC-CR-03-04, 2004 Navajo Sup. LEXIS 13, at *12 (Navajo
Nation Sup. Ct. Dec. 16, 2004) (adopting “the minimum requirements from Miranda as consistent
with [their] Navajo values”).
270. Tracy v. Superior Court of Maricopa Cty., 810 P.2d 1030, 1047–48 (Ariz. 1991).
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system, the decision is highly persuasive, even though not binding.
Further, the Navajo tribal courts have also held that self-incrimination
protections are “fundamental” and protected, including under the Navajo
Bill of Rights.271
Tribal courts, notably the NICS judicial consortium, have found it
proper to impose a single interpretation of self-incrimination protections
in accordance with the precedent set by the U.S. Supreme Court. The
Eighth Circuit highlighted the difficulty defendants and tribal courts
would otherwise encounter, bluntly stating that the powers of the federal
judicial process “cannot be circumscribed by the speculative uses to which
such testimony may subsequently be put by another sovereignty not
subject to the commands of the Fifth Amendment.”272
C.

Decisions by Courts of Appeal Interpreting Analogous ICRA
Protections Are Strongly Persuasive in the Event of Habeas Review
and Should Be Adopted by District and Tribal Courts

In consideration of tribal sovereignty, and a long history of interpreting
statutes in favor of such sovereignty rather than federal precedent,273
decisions by federal courts are not binding upon the tribal courts.274
However, because tribal defendants may subsequently bring a writ of
habeas corpus for violations of ICRA before a federal court,275 federal
precedent becomes applicable in those cases.
At least one Court of Appeals has implied, without deciding, that the
protections afforded by ICRA are co-extensive with the Fifth Amendment
and would prohibit compelled testimony.276 Likewise, the Ninth and
Eighth Circuits both held that tribal searches and seizures are evaluated
under a Fourth Amendment standard.277 Relying heavily on the identical
language in both the Bill of Rights and ICRA, the Ninth Circuit
determined that an analysis under the Fourth Amendment results in the
same conclusion as an analysis under ICRA. Further, the court assumed

271. Navajo Nation v. MacDonald Jr., 19 Indian L. Rep. 6079, 6084 (Navajo Nation Sup. Ct. 1992).
272. In re Long Visitor, 523 F.2d 443, 447 (8th Cir. 1975) (emphasis added).
273. Tavares v. Whitehouse, 851 F.3d 863, 869 (9th Cir. 2017).
274. GARROW & DEER, supra note 152, at 248.
275. 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (2012).
276. In re Long Visitor, 523 F.2d at 447.
277. United States v. Becerra-Garcia, 397 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Lester,
647 F.2d 869, 872 (8th Cir. 1981); see also United States v. Clifford, 664 F.2d 1090, 1091 n.3 (8th
Cir. 1981).
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in Becerra-Garcia, as had others, that violations of ICRA would result in
suppression of evidence during a federal proceeding.278
Like the search and seizure provisions of the Fourth Amendment and
ICRA, the language of the self-incrimination provisions is identical.
Because of the “identical limitation”279 imposed on the federal and tribal
governments by the respective language, courts are likely to apply Fifth
Amendment analysis and precedent when hearing a motion to suppress in
a federal proceeding or during a habeas hearing. It is counterproductive
for tribal courts to apply an independent interpretation of the protections
provided by ICRA, only to have a defendant released or a case remanded
for rehearing by a federal court upon habeas review which applies Fifth
Amendment standards.
D.

Tribal Prosecution Is a Sufficient Risk to Personal Liberty and
Warrants Self-Incrimination Protections

Unlike the truly foreign prosecutions addressed by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Balsys,280 the semi-sovereign tribal nations within the United
States pose a sufficient risk of prosecution for a defendant to invoke the
right and privilege against self-incrimination. In the case of a tribal
defendant, up to three separate jurisdictions may exercise their authority,
with Double Jeopardy affecting none of the prosecutions. A tribal court
could prosecute a hypothetical defendant and compel that defendant to
testify under the tribal court’s standard. A state or federal court could then
prosecute that same defendant using that compelled testimony as
inculpatory evidence. Furthermore, a defendant may avoid a truly foreign
threat of prosecution by avoiding the nation posing that threat (absent the
risk of extradition). However, tribal defendants risk “foreign” prosecution
every time they cross into a reservation—a reservation which may literally
be across the street and be their childhood home.
V.

CONSTITUTIONALLY SUFFICIENT GRANTS OF
IMMUNITY BY FEDERAL, STATE OR TRIBAL COURTS
SHOULD BE MUTUALLY BINDING

Legal precedent and ICRA’s congressional intent call for a Fifth
Amendment analysis of ICRA violations. Additionally, courts should
consider the possibility of prosecution in either a tribal, state, or federal
court a sufficient threat for the defendant to invoke the privilege against
278. Becerra-Garcia, 397 F.3d at 1171.
279. Id.
280. See supra text accompanying notes 59–63.
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self-incrimination. Having adopted a singular self-incrimination analysis,
grants of immunity satisfying the Kastigar standards warrant a mutually
binding effect across tribal, state, and federal court.
A.

The Policy and Constitutional Reasoning Making Federal and
State Grants of Immunity Binding Applies Equally to Tribal Courts

Various theories underlie mutually binding grants of immunity and are
directly applicable to tribal defendants. In Murphy, the Court held that
mutually binding grants of immunity are permissible, as the other
jurisdiction is left in the same situation as if the defendant invoked the
privilege against self-incrimination.281 This is especially relevant if a
defendant subject to concurrent jurisdiction is entitled to invoke selfincrimination protections in federal or state court due to the possibility of
prosecution in tribal court, or vice versa. However, the adoption of a
singular Fifth Amendment standard is a prerequisite for mutually binding
grants of immunity to ensure that all jurisdictions are operating under the
same circumstance; otherwise, Murphy would ring hollow.
Even if a court found that prosecution in a tribal court is insufficient to
invoke self-incrimination privileges elsewhere, the application of a Fifth
Amendment standard would preclude the use of testimony in a tribal court
compelled by another jurisdiction. As the Court held in United States v.
Allen,282 the use of compelled testimony is precluded, even if generated
by a foreign jurisdiction, when the protections provided are
constitutionally insufficient.283 Therefore, mutually binding grants of
immunity would result in an outcome similar to one in which a defendant
exercises the full panoply of privileges and protections offered by ICRA
and the Fifth Amendment.
Additionally, as the Supreme Court of Arizona identified in Tracy, the
U.S. Supreme Court’s language in Murphy pointed to a broader
applicability than merely a state/federal relationship.284 Murphy permits
the use of compelled, immunized testimony in “one jurisdiction within
our federal structure” even if such evidence would support a conviction
in “another such jurisdiction.”285 Although tribal jurisdictions are quasisovereign entities, they remain within the “federal structure” of the United
States, subject to the plenary powers of Congress; this unique relationship
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.

Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964).
864 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2017).
Id. at 82.
Tracy v. Superior Court of Maricopa Cty., 810 P.2d 1030, 1049 (Ariz. 1991).
Murphy, 378 U.S. at 53 (emphasis added).
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gives rise to “a distinct likelihood of dual prosecution by tribal and federal
courts.”286 As such, Murphy could and should be extended to include tribal
courts.
Arguably, both tribal and federal precedent have already established a
legal construct in which prosecutors cannot use immunized and compelled
testimony directly or as a derivative, and mutually binding grants of
immunity are a mere formality. However, formal recognition of the
mutually binding effects would simplify and streamline criminal
prosecutions, as well as avoid the need to litigate the issue every time
grants of immunity are present.
B.

Grants of Immunity Empower Tribal Nations, Validate Tribal
Justice System Procedures, and Facilitate Alternative Resolutions

In addition to serving as a formal recognition of grants of immunity,
especially by tribal courts, mutually binding effects would have second
level benefits as well. Extending recognition of tribal grants of immunity
would place tribal courts on equal footing with federal and state
counterparts. Granting immunity is almost exclusively a reflection of
prosecutorial priorities and policies that, to date, have not included the
priorities of tribal prosecutions.287 By imposing Kastigar limitations on
subsequent prosecutions following tribal grants of immunity, tribal courts
(and, tangentially, tribal leadership) may give true effect to tribal priorities
on courts with concurrent jurisdiction.
Further, recognition would likely impose a duty, especially on federal
prosecutors, to include tribes with concurrent jurisdiction in discussions
prior to pursuing consecutive prosecutions or offering grants of immunity.
Because current policy requires cooperative efforts only between federal
and state prosecutors,288 the decision-making process fails to definitively
include tribal prosecutors beyond professional courtesy. However, by
making grants of immunity mutually binding across all three types of
jurisdiction, all are impacted by the decision of one and will require the
input of all jurisdictions involved.
Tribes will also be able to make decisions as to what they consider the
proper course of action, without the fear of future state or federal
prosecution utilizing tribally immunized testimony and undermining the
tribal decision. This will also enhance the tribe’s abilities to pursue more
traditional remedies, such as Elder Panels, which focus heavily on

286. Tracy, 810 P.2d at 1049.
287. CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL, supra note 85, § 720.
288. JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 141, § 9-2.031.
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truthfulness and reconciliation, by offering a defendant the proper level of
immunity in exchange for full participation in such a remedy.
CONCLUSION
Tribal, state, and federal cases demonstrate a continuing reluctance to
impose a constitutional gloss on the self-incrimination protections
mandated by the Indian Civil Rights Act. Instead, courts interpret statutes
in favor of tribal independence and sovereignty rather than constitutional
compliance. In the absence of a repeal of ICRA, this Comment argues for
the evaluation of ICRA’s privilege against self-incrimination under a Fifth
Amendment standard along with associated federal precedent. Some
courts, including federal, state, and tribal courts, have reached a similar
conclusion. Meanwhile, the Eighth and Ninth Circuits of Appeal have set
an analogous and persuasive precedent, imposing a federal standard and
analysis of tribal searches and seizures due to the almost identical
language of the Bill of Rights and ICRA. This Comment also suggests
that grants of immunity to compel testimony by a tribal, state, or federal
court should be mutually binding and evaluated under the U.S. Supreme
Court decision in Kastigar v. United States. Such mutual effect furthers
the gravitas and authority of tribal decisions, provides clarity and
consistent protections for a defendant, and empowers tribes to pursue
appropriate sanctions, remedies, and reconciliation.

